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KIERKEGAARD'S PLACE 
IN THE HERMENEUTIC PROJECT 
Roy MARTINEZ 
RÉSUMÉ : Cet article examine les liens entre la pensée de Kierkegaard et Vherméneutique contem-
poraine, particulièrement telle que celle-ci s'exprime dans le livre récent de J. Caputo, Radical 
Hermeneutics. 
SUMMARY: The basic theme of radical hermeneutics — the effort to restore life to its original 
difficulty, i.e., to take stock of life in all of its uncertainty and undecidability — draws deeply 
upon Kierkegaard's project as a writer. The key terms here are "restore" and "original". For 
if something needs to be restored to its original form or status, the implication is that it has 
been covered up, bastardized, or falsified. According to radical hermeneutics, the classic Western 
metaphysics of presence, which takes Being as an abiding permanence (essentia, natura, eidos, 
ousiaj has engendered this illusion. It is for this reason that Caputo (in his recent book Radical 
Hermeneutics) endorses Heraclitus, not Parmenides; Aristotle instead of Plato; Nietzsche instead 
of Hegel. The religious insight that animates radical hermeneutics — its attempt to cope with 
the sufferings induced by the flux, and its rejection of metaphysics — brings it into a deep and 
genuine association with Kierkegaard's thought. 
T he basic theme of radical hermeneutics — the effort to restore life to its original difficulty, i.e., to take stock of life in all of its uncertainty and undecidability, all 
of its vicissitudes and even sufferings — draws deeply upon Kierkegaard's project as 
a writer. At once, two key terms stand out: "restore" and "original." For if something 
needs to be restored to its original form or status, the implication is that it has somehow 
been covered up, bastardized, distorted or falsified. According to radical hermeneutics, 
the classic Western metaphysics of presence, which takes Being as an abiding per-
manence {essentia, natura, eidos, ousia) has engendered this illusion. Little wonder 
that Caputo elects to endorse Heraclitus over Parmenides, Aristotle over Plato, 
Nietzsche over Hegel. In each case, he sides with a thinker for whom the stability of 
pure presence is subverted by the active principle of life itself. This is a profoundly 
Kierkegaardian motif. For Kierkegaard, speculative philosophy or idealism — in any 
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version, but more specifically Platonic and Hegelian — tries to make things too easy, 
and fosters the egregious error that reason is coextensive with existence.1 
It is clear, then, that both radical hermeneutics and Kierkegaard have a common 
antagonist: metaphysics. But radical hermeneutics wants to do more than that. For 
Kierkegaard is not only a piece of its conceptual machinery, but a vital part of its 
spiritual engine. This is carried out indirectly by its deployment of two major pseu-
donymous authors: Constantine Constantius and Johannes CJimacus. The point of the 
present essay, therefore, is to ask: Will the motor work? Or, to put the same question 
in straightforward philosophical parlance: Is it legitimate for radical hermeneutics to 
treat the concept of repetition as coterminous with kinesis, and then to suggest that 
such convergence accords with Kierkegaard's undertaking as a writer? Does Caputo's 
commitment to the restoration of life as a philosophic engagement converge with 
Kierkegaard's project? Does Kierkegaard have a place within the "hermeneutic 
project?" 
Underlying this question is the contention that radical hermeneutics pretends to 
be the "postmodern" version of Kierkegaardian repetition. Such a position is discernible 
in terms of the project's deconstructive approach to subjectivity.2 In what follows I 
shall argue that radical hermeneutics' understanding of Constantinian repetition has 
firm support in the pseudonymous authorship, that it draws deeply upon its Kierke-
gaardian sources. I carry this out by showing that Caputo captures its most vital 
features: the futurity of its thrust, the groundlessness of its freedom, and the trans-
cendence of its reason for being. Thus, I address two issues in the essay: (1 ) the place 
of Kierkegaardian repetition in hermeneutics, however radical and (2) the question of 
the ethico-religious and how it is carried out in Caputo's hermeneutic endeavor. 
I. REPETITION 
As an intellectual enterprise, radical hermeneutics emerges on the scene with an 
impressive equipment of philosophical culture: besides Kierkegaard, it is undergirded 
by three other seminal minds, namely, Heidegger, Husserl, and Derrida. First, then, 
1. Climacus-Kierkegaard observes: "The Hegelian philosophy culminates in the proposition that the outward 
is the inward and the inward is the outward. With this Hegel virtually finishes. But this principle is essentially 
an aesthetic-metaphysical one, and in this way the Hegelian philosophy is happily finished, or it is fraudulently 
finished by lumping everything (including the ethical and the religious) indiscriminately in the aesthetic-
metaphysical," Soren KIERKEGAARD, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David E Swenson and 
Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 263n. Hereafter, CUP. 
2. The reader might want to consult Patrick BIGELOW'S The Cunning of Being: a Kierkegaardian Demonstration 
of the Postmodern Implosion of Metaphysical Sense in Aristotle and the Early Heidegger (Tallahasee: The 
Florida State University Press, 1990), and also Theodore KISIEL'S review of this book in Soren Kierkegaard 
Newsletter, 23 (April, 1991), p. 8-9. For more on the subject in the wake of its deconstruction as a 
metaphysical orepistemological foundation, seeG.B. MADISON, The Hermeneutics of Postmodemity: Figures 
and Themes (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988). Chapters Six and Ten: "Ricoeur 
and the Hermeneutics of the Subject" and "The Hermeneutics of (Inter)Subjectivity, or: The Mind-Body 
Problem Deconstructed," respectively, would be of special interest to the reader. Also, Calvin O. SCHRAG'S 
Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1989), should be consulted. In this book, special attention should be paid to Part Two: "The New 
Horizon of Subjectivity." 
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comes Heidegger, and by implication, Aristotle. The point of departure is Heidegger's 
"hermeneutics of facticity," "by which he meant a reading of life which catches life 
at its game of taking flight and thereby restores factical existence to its original 
difficulty."3 The inspiration to construe existence in its full dynamic structure came 
to Heidegger from the startling manner in which he was, as a young thinker, rereading 
Aristotle. It occurred to him then "to read the Nichomachean Ethics as a story about 
factical life and its difficulties and the Metaphysics in such a way as to read the kinesis 
back into ousia, to read ousia back down into its kinetic components, to deconstruct 
(ah-bauen) it down to iauf), the turbulence that meta-physics was trying to smooth 
over, still, arrest. And he saw Aristotle as doing both these things at once, so that 
Aristotle is at odds with himself."4 (Husserl and Derrida, however, are not essential 
to what I have to say about Kierkegaard within the hermeneutic tradition). 
Accordingly, since the Aristotelian kinesis is strategically identified with the con-
cept of repetition as expounded by Constantine Constantius, the view is defended that 
everything in hermeneutics turns on the very possibility of repetition itself. In this 
sense "hermeneutics is always a work of retrieval (Wiederholung), a laying out (aus-
legen) which fetches back (wiederholen), an explicating which retrieves what is latent 
and puts it into words for the first time."5 It is obvious, then, that repetition is at the 
central nerve of radical hermeneutics, and that it bears a conceptual affinity to Aristotle's 
theory of motion. How can this be? 
Insofar as they collectively constitute a polemic against speculative philosophy, 
it is in the Kierkegaardian personae that the difficulty of life is "put into words."6 
Correspondingly, because existence is the central theme of Kierkegaard's enterprise, 
Kierkegaard employs the poetic mode in the form of polynymity. The pseudonyms 
3. John D. CAPUTO, Radical Hermeneutics. Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project (Bloo-
mington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 1. Hereafter, RH. For more on the earlier 
works of Heidegger before and up to Being and Time, see John VAN BUREN, "The Young Heidegger and 
Phenomenology," Man and World, 23 (1990), p. 239-272; "The Young Heidegger: Rumor of a Hidden 
King (1919-1926)," Philosophy Today, 33, 2 (1989), p. 99-109, and The Young Heidegger (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, forthcoming). 
4. Ibid., p. 2. 
5. Ibid., p. 1. Calvin O. Schrag questions Derrida and Caputo on their reading of Aristotle's notions of time 
and motion: "Apparently, Derrida and Caputo find much in the margins of Aristotle's text that eludes the 
more ordinary readers. As one of these more ordinary readers, however, it is difficult for me to make sense 
of Aristotle's three forms of kinesis (qualitative alteration, quantitative change, and locomotion) without 
the requirement of an abiding substratum. In the qualitative alteration of a leaf as it changes its color from 
green to brown, the supposite of change remains identical with itself. The leaf remains a leaf. In the change 
of quantitative increase as a pumpkin grows from two pounds to four, Aristotle would have us believe that 
the pumpkin, as a proper subject of change, abides throughout the process. In the 'simple change' of 
locomotion, an arrow traversing a series of points, the subject remains fully intact as it simply moves from 
one place to another. Even in 'radical change', generation and destruction, (which Aristotle distinguishes 
from his three forms of kinesis), the substrate of prime matter remains. So whether one is talking of kinesis 
or whether one is talking of radical change, in which a particular substance is either generated or destroyed, 
the grammar of an abiding substratum remains in use" (Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 
20, 1 (January 1989), p. 87). It is obvious that Schrag does justice to Aristotle in regards to Metaphysica 
and Physica, for example. I think, however, that Caputo in his capacity as an hermeneuticist, endeavors 
to read the Nichomachean Ethics in the light of a non-substantialist conception of the moral agent as this 
latter is compelled to act in an ever-changing world. 
6. CUP, p. 243. 
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take a passionate interest in existence in its dynamic structure and diverse dimensions.7 
In fact, this existential situation is what is being retrieved poetically in the authorship. 
The significance of polynymity can be further underscored by taking into account 
the primacy of concrete, individual existence. Since human existence is distributed 
individually as freedom, it is impossible to subsume it under a system of thought, or 
explain it away by means of the spurious movements of logic. For this reason, Hegel's 
attempt to identify Christianity with speculation is not only abortive, but is a monstrous 
hoax as well, for while the latter is determined by necessity, ideality, and eternity as 
presence, the former is animated by freedom, actuality, arid time as a task. Hence, 
in Kierkegaard's scheme of things, there is a relation between diverse types of expe-
riences, as exemplified by the various pseudonyms, and the forms of linguistic articu-
lation to which they correspond. 
Furthermore, in his effort to rescue existence from the falsifying proclivity of 
metaphysics, Kierkegaard means to preserve both the integrity of the individual and 
the irreducibility of life. Indeed, since the ethical reality of the existing subject cannot 
be communicated directly to another, the best that an author can hope for in this 
respect is to act as a poet and forge characters to represent his or her views, thoughts, 
and ideals. This is Kierkegaard's justification for the pseudonymous authorship. Also, 
this is why he regards these poetic works as aesthetic, for they are mere mediations 
between thought and existence; as such, they cannot be accurate reproductions of 
experience. After all, authentic existence transpires only ethico-religiously, to say the 
least. 
Quite in agreement with this principle, Vigilius Haufniensis writes: "Every human 
life is planned religiously."8 In stating his thesis teleologically, Haufniensis means to 
say that everyone is compelled to look at life circumspectly — appreciate its joys, 
suffer its pains, endure its sorrows, act decisively — and then to cope with the 
consequences with unflagging resolution. In Kierkegaard's lexicon this kind of courage 
is called faith; and curiously, it is at this juncture that Kierkegaard once more converges 
with Aristotle. For the dynamic structure of life implies motion, the measure of which 
Aristotle regards as time; in turn, Kierkegaard considers time as the conditio sine qua 
non for the exercise of repetition. Whereas, however, Aristotle designates phronesis 
as the means with which to deal ethically with the temporal flux, the pseudonyms 
employ a host of terms that are meant to culminate in the Christian faith: irony, infinite 
resignation, humor, faith, inwardness, sin,and, of course, repetition. 
In conjunction with their reference to time, these terms, like the Aristotelian 
phronesis, also bespeak the lack of a rule to which a person may revert in meeting 
the demands of a given situation.9 Since no two situations are the same, and since 
7. Ibid., p. 236. 
8. Soren KIERKEGAARD, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Low rie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1967), p. 94. Hereafter, CD. 
9. Apropos of phronesis, the following statement by Gadamer is relevant: "Phronesis is always the process 
of distinguishing and choosing what one considers to be right;"' also: "As important as Heidegger and his 
1923 phronesis interpretations were for me, 1 was already prepared for it on my own, above all by my 
earlier reading of Kierkegaard, by the Platonic Socrates, and by the powerful effect of the poet Stephen 
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time is irreversible and the future undisclosed, the onus is on the individual to muster 
enough courage in order to personalize the situation with a judgment without precedent, 
i.e., with decisiveness. It is this unhampered action, beset by neither habit nor fear, 
that is instrumental in the generation of history. But as Judge Wilhelm observes, 
"history is more than the product of the free actions of free individuals. The individual 
indeed acts, but his action passes into the order of things which sustains the whole 
of existence. What will be the issue of it the agent does not really know. But the higher 
order of things which digests, so to speak, the free actions and weaves them into its 
eternal law is necessity, and this necessity is the dynamic of world history."10 
The Judge's statement accentuates the dual nature of existence. As freedom, it is 
individuated at the moment of decisive action, and this transpires in subjective solitude. 
Some of the consequences that ensue are never intended as such by the agent. No 
sooner do they eventuate, however, than they are immediately sedimented in the 
intersubjective community and pass over into the illusory "necessity" of history. The 
problem is that since history and time are intertwined, and since the latter is inscrutable 
especially in its forward thrust, there is a tendency in the existing subject to attempt 
the impossible: to evade the flux of life by camouflaging its contingencies, avoiding 
its irregularities, and controling its unpredictability. Presumably this is done in the 
name of philosophy, which, according to the Judge, "views history under the category 
of necessity, not under that of freedom."11 
That is how Haufniensis must be understood when he avers that "when Aristotle 
says that the transition from possibility to actuality is a kinesis, this is not to be 
understood logically but with reference to historical freedom."12 The main point here 
is that time, freedom, and history are embedded in the warp and woof of human 
existence, and any effort to deny it is bound to be abortive. That is why caution should 
be exercised in dealing with Aristotle. For although he is reputed to be the father of 
logic, he is also a seminal writer of treatises on ethics and politics. This is clear to 
the author of The Concept of Dread. In considering the concept ofkinesis, Haufniensis 
stresses the freedom that generates history, not the necessity that preoccupies logic. 
He is more interested in ethics because it is the region of decision-making, the site 
where the event of self-(trans)formation occurs. In brief, insofar as making a decision 
George on my generation," "A Letter by Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer" in Richard BERNSTEIN, Beyond 
Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia 
Press, 1988), p. 264-265. Maclntyre observes that the term characterizes someone who "knows how to 
exercise judgment in particular cases," in Alasdair MACINTYRE, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 
21"1 edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 154. Or, consider Lyotard's view: 
"... I think that... a judge worthy of the name has no true model to guide his judgments, and that the true 
nature of the judge is to pronounce judgments, and therefore prescriptions, just so, without criteria. This 
is, after all, what Aristotle calls prudence. It consists in dispensing justice without models. It is not possible 
to produce a learned discourse upon what justice is. This is the difference between dialectics, for example, 
and the episteme or didactics in Aristotle. This is tantamount to stating... that prescriptions are not of the 
order of knowledge," in Jean-Francois LYOTARD and Jean-Loup THEBAUD, Just Gaming, trans. Wlad 
Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 25. 
10. Soren KIERKEGAARD, Either/Or, Vol. 2, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 
p. 178. Hereafter, E/O 2. 
11. Ibid., p. 179. 
12. CD, p. 74n. 
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implicates the subject existentially (the French and the German are clearer: Je me 
décide; Ich entscheide mich) it is the moment of utmost subjective solitude.13 
This solitude reverberates in the Judge's advice to his young friend urging him to 
choose despair, for "one cannot despair without choosing. And when a man despairs 
he chooses again — and what is it he chooses? He chooses himself, not in his immediacy, 
not as this fortuitous individual, but he chooses himself in his eternal validity."14 In 
different words, every choice is an instance of self-formation: it is the birth of self. 
Every such event carries with it the excruciating pangs of childbirth. For involved in 
the process is a tension between emancipation and emergence: emancipation from 
primitive immediacy, emergence into a new immediacy. The fortuitous individual is, 
in a manner of speaking, forsaken for one personally forged and upon whom, by virtue 
of this very act, is conferred eternal validity, i.e., an irreducible and unique sense of 
self-worth and personal achievement.15 
Without going into further details, it should be noted that this basic tension is 
present throughout the pseudonymous authorship. For example, in Fear and Trembling, 
it assumes the form of the teleological suspension of the ethical: the individual is 
caught between the behest of private conscience and the requirements of social morality. 
In The Concept of Dread, it falls under the category of dread, which represents, 
according to Climacus' assessment of the book, the individual's "state of mind in the 
desperate emancipation from the task of realizing the ethical."16 Psychologically, this 
can be expressed as the tension that occurs during the transition period from shut-
upness (Indesluttedhed), habit (Vane), i.e., the fear of acting freely, to the expansiveness 
of a state of mind which Haufniensis calls seriousness (Alvor), inwardness (Inder-
ligheden), freedom (Friheden), certitude (Visheden), and subjectivity (Subjektiviteten). 
All these terms denote the individual's willingness to do the good. Contrariwise, habit 
or unfreedom means the indolence of languishing in what is comfortable and familiar 
at the expense of risk-taking. For this reason, that is, because it dreads the good, 
13. In an analysis of decision, for example, Ricoeur writes: "...decision culminates in the determination of 
self by oneself: I make up my own mind (Je me décide), it is I who determine myself and myself whom 
I determine. The pronominal form of speaking underlines very well this relation at once active and reflective 
of the self on itself," Paul RICOEUR, "The Unity of the Voluntary and the Involuntary as a Limiting Idea," 
in The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work, eds. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1978), p. 5. 
14. E/O 2, p. 215. For more on the choice of self, see Roy MARTINEZ, "Socrates and Judge Wilhelm: A Case 
of Kierkegaardian Ethics," Philosophy Today, 31 (Spring 1990), p. 39-47. 
15. Referring to the Judge's advice to his young friend to choose himself "in his eternal validity," M. Holmes 
Hartshorne writes: "What is the meaning of this rather presumptious-sounding phrase? When one chooses 
oneself in one's eternal validity, i.e., ethically, one chooses an existence defined by those norms that are 
assumed to be valid and normative for all men, without exception. One decides to live according to those 
eternal principles, that absolute moral law, which hold for mankind as such," Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver: 
The Nature and Meaning of His Pseudonymous Writings (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 
19. What Hartshorne emphasizes is the social context, the dimension of our belonging-together, the 
individual's implicit sense of solidarity with humankind, that accompanies the deliberations preceding 
decision-making. But there is also a sense of personal achievement, a feeling that we have accomplished 
something worthy of ourselves, when we make a decision. For more on this point, see Roy MARTINEZ'S 
review of «Kierkegaard, Godly Deceiver» in The Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (1992), p. 449-52. 
16. CUP, p. 240. 
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habit is predicated as demoniacal.I7 Parenthetically, this is the route taken by speculative 
philosophy or metaphysics. It pretends that human life can be dealt with as a structure 
with predictable and contrôlable patterns. It attempts not merely to temper but to 
conceal the harshest and most difficult element of existence. In The Sickness unto 
Death the tension exists in the self's delicate balancing act between each pair of terms 
that constitute its triadic structure: finitude-infinitude, necessity-possibility, tempo-
rality-eternity. Here it is a matter of not simply recognizing but of acknowledging in 
the same breath the apparently opposing factors of the syntheses. Eternity, for example, 
cannot be viewed independently of or as being inimical to time. Rather, both must be 
understood in terms of each other. The self, then, does not essentialy have a telos 
which is redeemable in recollecting its ontological origin (Plato's anamnesis), where 
it would repose in peace everlastingly. Instead, what is in store for it is the task of 
wrestling ceaselessly with the onslaughts of time, the latter's mockery of our deepest 
desire for continued existence, its erosion of our fondest dreams, its elusiveness from 
the sure grasp of our minds, as testified by Augustine, for example. 
In brief, we must contend with time's flux and uncertainties. This is what Cons-
tantine realizes. He understands that both recollection and repetition are concerned 
with the transition from time to eternity, and that is why he regards them as being 
the same movement. Constantine writes: "...repetition is a decisive expression for 
what 'recollection' was for the Greeks. Just as they taught that all knowledge is a 
recollection, so will modern philosophy teach that the whole of life is a repetition. 
.. .Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions."18 
In the context of radical hermeneutics the underlying question is: "How does the 
existing, temporal individual make his way from time to eternity?" Constantine notes 
that the Greek response is to move backwards, from time to eternal préexistence. 
Caputo explains: "... there are two things to be emphasized about this characterization. 
In the first place, it holds that eternity is, or has been already, present and that its 
17. CD, 105ff. 
18. Soren KIERKEGAARD, Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: 
Harper and Row, The Cloister Library, 1964), p. 33. In the authorship repetition is a multilayered concept. 
Compressed into it are different spheres of spiritual activities. For example, when it concerns the removal 
of "the wrath impending upon that of which" the sinner "has made himself quilty" (Niels THULSTRUP, 
"Commentator's Introduction," Soren KIERKEGAARD, Philosophical Fragments, trans. David Swenson and 
Howard Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), it is God's atonement. As the individuals's 
grief over having remained in sin, i.e., the individual's willingness to change his or her thoughts and actions, 
it is Christian repentance. As rationality or immanence, it admits of varying degrees of inwardness, and 
as such it can ultimately culminate in religious faith. Ethico-religiously, i.e., when as rationality it recognizes 
"the given independence of every man, and after the measure of his ability do all that can in truth be done 
to help someone preserve it" (CUP, p. 232), it is called resignation. The case of Socrates is paradigmatic. 
Ethically, as in the case of Judge Wilhelm, repetition is embodied in the vow of matrimony, where love 
transfigures into conjugal fidelity. Properly speaking, however, repetition begins in faith, a tenet that is 
propounded not only by Constantius but by Haufniensis as well. The reader might also want to consult a 
more general version of repetition in EH. HEINEMANN'S "Origin and Repetition." He establishes a difference 
between mere beginning and origin, correlates the latter with the concept of repetition, then argues that 
repetition is basically a formal structure. Though he considers KIERKEGAARD'S book Repetition, Heinemann 
does not go into a detailed analysis of Kierkegaard's work. I would like to note, however, that in correlating 
origin and repetition, Heinemann accords, mutatis mutandis, with Haufniensis' view of the matter in The 
Concept of Dread (The Review of Metaphysics, 4, 2 (December 1950), p. 201-214). 
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presence has been lost. Eternity is in the past; it is a lost actuality. Secondly, the 
backward movement signifies for Constantine the attempt to extricate oneself from 
time, to back oneself out of it."19 As opposed to the Greek way, Climacus concurs 
with Constantius that the movement cannot be one of retreat or return, but one of 
advance and discovery. The former adduces the case of Socrates as a prime instance 
of an individual who resists "the temptation" to slip out of the flux by recollecting 
himself out of existence. Socrates adheres to the task, never for a moment forgetting 
that he is an existing thinker, not a speculative philosopher. When he thinks, he does 
so existentially. This means that Socrates acknowledges and abides by the claims made 
upon him by existence.20 
In other words, Socrates does not draft a blueprint of what he imagines, or how 
he'd like, existence to be. He does not build a system and pretend that it is a faithful 
representation of life. For human thought does not have it within its power so to 
penetrate the innermost core of time, so to pervade the uttermost dimensions of 
temporality, as to be fully co-present with it. That is, rather, the divine prerogative, 
God's own domain. But since human existence is constituted of the temporal and the 
eternal, as Anti-Climacus maintains in The Sickness unto Death, it is possible to align 
both elements of the synthesis in such a way that the individual remains within the 
parameters of existence, immersed in the flux, but not submerged by it. This is the 
Socratic way. The paradox of Socratic ignorance is a variation of it. 
Interestingly enough, the case Climacus is trying to build on behalf of Socrates 
has, I think, an advocate in a contemporary writer. C.D.C. Reeve contends that for 
Socrates the elenchus is the greatest good as far as human beings are concerned.21 
According to him, Socrates knows that virtue can never be attained in this world. The 
truth-value of virtue, in other words, lies in its ideality. Furthermore, what lends 
credence to this thesis is the belief on the part of Socrates that the elenchus permits 
of future arguments to be vitiated by the elenchus itself. It is for this reason that Reeve 
considers it apt to connect the elenctic activities of Socrates with happiness and the 
hereafter: "He claims, indeed, that unending elenctic examination after death would 
be inconceivable happiness. This would not be so — unending elenctic examination 
would not be inconceivable happiness — if happiness lay only at the end of an elenctic 
examination successfully completed."22 
This amounts to saying that the elenchus is not an end in itself; it serves as a 
means towards the attainment of human virtue, knowledge, and happiness. As such, 
the elenchus never loses its value, for intrinsically it guards against culpable ignorance 
and vice. Moreover, it is for this reason that the examined life is the best human life: 
such reasoned existence virtually guarantees the recognition of the partiality of every 
human standpoint, as well as the corrigibility of every ethical conviction. Therefore, 
19. CAPUTO, "Hermeneutics as the Recovery of Man," Man and World 15 (1982), p. 345. 
20. CUP, p. 184. 
21. For more on the Socratic elenchus, see Richard ROBINSON'S Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2"1 edition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1953). 
22. C.D.C. REEVE, Socrates in the "Apology." An Essay on Plato's "Apologv of Socrates" (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1989), p. 178. 
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thought, though not commensurate with the temporal order itself, nevertheless pos-
sesses the wherewithal to cope meaningfully with its flux. Socrates adheres to this 
basic agenda of life. For implied in the elenchus is the forward movement of existence 
and inscribed in it is the individual's readiness to cope with its sequential disclosures. 
In dealing with time and eternity, then, the solution is not to be found in anamnesis 
but in the elenchus; not in recollection but in repetition. As Climacus says of Socrates, 
"Forward he must, backward he cannot go."23 
Thought is here used interchangeably with ratio, i.e., the individual's effort to 
build a secure basis where security is fundamentally absent. It seeks to establish a 
fundamentum inconcussum in the manner, for example, of Descartes' cogito and the 
rigorous science of Husserl. In brief, ratio is metaphysical reason, and very often, 
perhaps too often, it is used dogmatically. 
Reason, however, need not be restricted to ratio. In fact, the pseudonyms are 
quite aware that the employment of reason or understanding (Forstanden) constitutes 
its finitude but that reason is never exhausted by its operation at any given moment. 
Radical hermeneutics is sympathetic with this extra-ra//onal dimension that serves 
as a complement to historical existence: "Reason is not undone by the foundering of 
metaphysics but liberated, emancipated from metaphysical prejudices which tended 
to make of it something less than it is.. ."24 Since this is the case, an alternative "notion 
of 'reason' which begins by acknowledging the uncircumventable futility involved in 
trying to nail things down" is in order.25 If we try to invest things with an inflexible 
fixity in the name of reason, e.g., as a rule of law or as a principle of reason, reason 
itself finds it justifiable to question the legitimacy of such closure. 
This postmetaphysical version of rationality, which "resist(s) the notion that the 
life of reason can be formalized,"26 prefers to "defend the play of reason against the 
principle of reason."27 The implication here is that unlike metaphysical reason, which 
craves "the stability of the ground, the solidity of presence — terra firma — " 
postmetaphysical rationality opts to identify itself with the flux. After all, "(t)he flux 
is that sphere of groundlessness which Heidegger calls Spiel, the play which plays 
without why... Indeed the play is all."28 But if all is play, if every proposition is subject 
to scrutiny and disruption by reason itself, then where is there a guarantee that a 
meaningful distinction between good and evil exists? How can there be an assurance 
that some human actions are good and others bad? Might not there be a temptation 
to think that any act is permissible, especially since compelling reasons may be offered 
on their behalf? Is there not in reason a definitive criterion for distinguishing the 
moral worth of our decisions and acts? Are there not clear and decidable differences 
among things, or are we merely captives to the ambiguity of the flux? These ethical 
issues are not thematically treated by Heidegger. Radical hermeneutics, however, 
23. CUP, p. 187. 
24. RH, p. 209. 
25. Ibid., p. 211. 
26. Ibid., p. 226. 
27. Ibid., p. 227. 
28. Ibid., p. 224. 
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attempts to wrestle strenuously with them. Accordingly, the question that it asks is, 
"How can there be a morals without a metaphysics of morals?"29 
II. THE ETHICO-RELIGIOUS AND SUFFERING 
In Kierkegaard's thought, the ethico-religious is meaningless without the notion 
of freedom. The exercise of freedom, in turn, incurs suffering. Sin, guilt, dread, and 
despair, key terms in the Kierkegaardian corpus, are ample indices of the correlation 
between freedom and suffering. To the question, then, "How can there be a morals 
without a metaphysics of morals," Kierkegaard, reverting to the New Testament as 
the inspiration for his code of ethics, regards Christ as the paradigm of suffering on 
earth. The God-Man chooses to carry his cross; he doesn't attempt to escape the 
difficulty of life. No metaphysician, he! 
Accordingly, Kierkegaard offers him as the pattern to be followed by those who 
claim to believe in his promises. Christ, however, does not mean to be remembered 
only at the moment of his death. His life, too, is vitally consequential. He always 
considers those who suffer: the sick, the dying, the poor, the outcasts, the oppressed, 
the marginalized; and his effort consists in showing them how "the burden can be 
light," how "courage in suffering is able to take the power away from the world and 
to transform derision into honor, defeat into victory."30 The crisis involved in the 
exercise of freedom is likewise known to radical hermeneutics. The decision that cuts 
into the undecidability of life, accompanied by an awareness of the possibility of error 
in judgment, corresponds, mutatis mutandis, to the ethico religious task envisioned 
and undertaken by Kierkegaard. Whereas, however, Kierkegaard deals with this prob-
lem within a specifically Christian context, radical hermeneutics critically appropriates 
the insights of the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas considers the 
problem of suffering as it is manifested in the incarnate existence of the Other to be 
the reason for being of ethical engagement. This theme — the burden of freedom — 
is implied in an earlier reference made to the sphere of groundlessness that is nothing 
other than the flux. This major metaphor of flux has its conceptual counterpart in 
Kierkegaard's authorship. Haufniensis refers to it as freedom (Friheden), Climacus as 
the understanding (Forstanden); Constantius calls it repetition (Gjentehelsen), and Anti-
Climacus terms it the self (Selvet). Now when Haufniensis writes that "Freedom is 
infinite and does not arise out of anything,"31 and when Climacus refers to "faith's 
crucifixion of the understanding" (Troens Korsfaestelse af Forstanden)^2 they are 
alluding to what, in radical hermeneutics, is known as postmetaphysical rationality, 
29. Ibid., p. 257. 
30. Soren KIERKEGAARD, The Gospel of Suffering and the Lilies of the Field, trans. David Swenson and Lillian 
Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1948), p. 21-43; p. 138-64. For more on the theme 
of suffering, see KIERKEGAARD'S Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter 
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 386-468. About the manner in which "world" is 
to be understood in Kierkegaard, see Roy MARTINEZ, "Kierkegaard's Ideal of Inward Deepening," Phi-
losophy Today, 32 (1988), p. 110-17. 
31. CD, p. 100. 
32. CUP, p. 501; SV, X, p. 233. 
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the version of reason that allows for human incarnation and in the same breath 
acknowledges its intrinsic difference from such finite display. In addition, the argument 
presented by Haufniensis and supported by Constantius, Climacus and his opposite 
mate, is that since freedom presupposes nothing other than itself, it is through the 
qualitative leap, by means of self-assertiveness, i.e., through the action of the particular 
individual that the distinction between good and evil is posited.33 This amounts to 
saying that the freedom in question is not a piece of abstraction; it is a case of concretion. 
No one, after all, lives abstractly. In the context of the pseudonyms freedom is not 
an object of thought. It is rather the center of one's own existence. Therefore, no sooner 
does an individual act than his or her life is put on the line, i.e, it may be exposed 
to the wolves, in the language of radical hermeneutics. Yet, if the flux is all, it means 
that there is nowhere else to turn; it means that its ceaseless movement, its constant 
instability, its lack of security, is what demands our total attention, our visceral concern. 
We are required to cope with just that. A monumental task, this. In essence, then, 
directing our energies to this neverending transition, endeavoring to find meaning in 
this inexorable coming to be and passing away, is what Haufniensis has in mind when 
he asserts that "it is the supreme glory of freedom that it has only with itself to do."34 
Deconstructively, this becomes undecidability, namelessness. 
But, as has been intimated earlier, deep within the central nerve of freedom, 
embedded in its innermost core, are the cognate states of dread, guilt, and remorse. 
Undoubtedly, they are determinants of meaning, donors of sense, factors with which 
the life of ethics emerges into the world. This semiotic trio also indicates, as Ricoeur 
would say, a rupture within the being of the agent. Freedom, in other words, implies 
transcendence. When, therefore, radical hermeneutics attempts to establish a morals 
without the foundationalism of metaphysics, it does so with the understanding that 
freedom, which presupposes nothing other than itself, cannot be arrested and frozen 
in a particular hermeneutic moment. Every exercise of freedom (ethics included) 
involves an hermeneutic act, i.e., it is an interpretation, and no such act is granted 
privileged status over another. 
Whereas Kierkegaard's pseudonyms are wont to employ terms such as sin, remorse, 
and guilt to indicate transcendence, radical hermeneutics prefers the word "com-
passion." All these terms are expressions of "suffering," a word that occurs quite 
frequently throughout the authorship, and which plays a crucial role in the ethical 
undertaking that is radical hermeneutics. "Suffering is not merely suffering. It bursts 
asunder and opens us up to eternal things... (an eternally loving hand touching our 
lives in a mysterious manner?). It transforms itself before our eyes, metamorphoses 
from intrawordly and mundane event into an opening onto the whole."35 The whole 
in question is not a circumscribable totality, a delimited enclosure which may be said 
to encompass us. The whole refers instead to the mystery to which we are summoned 
to be open. We are summoned because the mystery is integral to our being. In the 
language of Anti-Climacus, we are a synthesis of the finite and the infinite. 
33. CD, p. 100. 
34. Ibid., p. 97. 
35. RH, p. 287. 
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Now "mystery" and "infinite" in the contexts of both the pseudonymous works 
and the radical hermeneutic project do not refer to an extramundane or otherworldly 
region that would be the object of some purely intellectual contemplation. No such 
abstraction or aestheticism is intended here. The mysterious-infinite is inscribed in 
the face of another human being, in the single individual, who is compelled to exist 
in the midst of all this suffering, entrapped in the whirl of the flux. When Kierkegaard 
insists that he is first and foremost a religious writer, he means among other things 
that he has nothing to do with the fraudulence of metaphysics, i.e., with the intellectual 
effort to overlook the life, the singular life, the irreducible existence of an individual 
person. Principles and laws do not suffer; institutions do not suffer; states, societies, 
and crowds do not suffer. They do not suffer because they have no flesh, no blood. 
They cannot ache; they do not bleed. 
According to radical hermeneutics, the religious and suffering are inextricably 
interlinked. "The religious is a response to what gives itself and withdraws in suffering. 
Suffering presents itself to the religious mind as a fundamental moral outrage, a 
violence with no rights which wastes life. Thus the religious attitude arises precisely 
as a protest against suffering. It is essentially defiant, protesting, protestant — against 
a violation of life which must not go unanswered — and catholic, because it speaks 
on behalf of all who suffer."36 
The convergence of the religious and suffering which are essential to the two 
projects under discussion indicates that a transcendence inhabits human existence. 
Whatever it is that we as humans do among ourselves: however excruciatingly the 
advantaged inflict pain upon the disadvantaged; however cruelly the privileged dis-
possess and oppress the underprivileged; with whatever callousness or indifference a 
demographic majority view the injustice it administers to a minority; however heart-
lessly we treat those among us who are considered social outcasts, misfits, the different 
— those who are not like us, those who do not look like us, those who do not think 
like us, those who occasion fear in us — transcendence means that any such situation 
need not be so. It further means that all this may change. It implies that there is always 
hope. In fact, it suggests, paradoxically, that the situation must change. But where 
there is hope, faith lurks around the corner, and where faith resides, love abides. And 
love, as the apostle says, conquers all. The Bishop of Hippo picks up on this, and 
writes: dilige, et quod vis fac (Love, and do as you will)." 
36. Ibid., p. 280. 
37. This phrase, plus questio mihi jactus sum, are expressions from St. Augustine of which John Caputo is 
particularly fond. Although Caputo critically endorses the thoughts of Augustine and Kierkegaard, the 
reader should be aware that insofar as faith is concerned, Kierkegaard rejects the attitude of Augustine: 
'Augustine has done incalculable harm. The whole of Christian doctrine through the centuries really rests 
upon him-and he has confused the concept of faith. 
Quite simply, Augustine resuscitated the platonic-aristotelian definition, the whole Greek philosophical 
pagan definition of faith... 
For the Greeks faith is a concept which belongs to the sphere of the intellect (especially in Plato's Republic, 
where the whole thing is magnificently done; Aristotle's Rhetoric also deserves attention). So faith is related 
to the probable, and we have the ascending scale of faith and knowledge. 
From the Christian point of view faith belongs to the existential: God did not appear in the character of a 
professor who has some doctrines which must first be believed and then understood." Soren KIERKEGAARD, 
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In the language of Haufniensis hope is freedom or originality (Oprindelighed), 
in that of Constantius it is repetition, and in the parlance of Anti-climacus hope is 
tranformed into possibility. Hope so conceived easily gives way to Anti-Climacus' 
oft-cited definition (an aesthetic move, be it noted) of God: "... God is that all things 
are possible, and that all things are possible is God."38 Far from merely reducing God 
to a propositional form, this formula inserts Him into a vital human context, the 
existential sphere of those who turn to Him in a moment of need, of those who find 
themselves in extreme situations. The definition is not meant to invite merely logical 
exercises and semantic musings. The possibility under discussion, in other words, is 
not an object of thought. Rather, it remains a medium of existence, a way of life, a 
"how" of living. 
The phenomenology that radical hermeneutics calls upon at this point is neither 
Heideggerian nor Kierkegaardian. Instead it invokes the insight of Emmanuel Levinas 
on the phenomenology of the human face. "The face is a shadowy place, a flickering 
region where we cannot always trust our eyes."39 There is nothing simple or unam-
biguous about it. While the face unconceals, it conceals as well. It hides as much as 
it reveals. Indeed, while we have access to the other through the face, the face remains 
a constant reminder of the inaccessibility of the other's otherness, our inability to 
circumscribe the other's infinity, the impossibility of naming the other's transcendence. 
The other's alterity eludes our finite grasp. Yet, the face speaks more ardently, more 
faithfully, than language itself: "The cold look with which the words are calmly 
delivered discloses an even greater anger than angry words. The look of hurt says 
more than the words which say it does not matter. The look of love which says nothing 
at all says more than any words; routine words of love are betrayed by eyes which 
show that love has gone dead."40 
The mystery of the face that eludes our grasp is not merely a visual appearance, 
a visible aspect. The other's being, the other's ontological privilege, is what truly 
escapes our finite calculation: "You can of course kill somebody physically; that is a 
tragically known fact. But you cannot, as they say in the gangster movies, 'erase' that 
person. Levinas explains this by attributing a certain 'infinity' and hence inextin-
guishability to the other person. The arm of the murderer is not long enough to reach 
the other, not in the other's true otherness, which is infinite, which thus exceeds 
everything empirical, and is thus an excess, an irreducible transcendence."41 But what 
connection is there between the face of the other and God? How does God, defined 
by Anti-Climacus as the possibility of all things, relate to the mystery of the other? 
Our inability to fathom the mystery of the other, the hermeneutic task that the face 
The Last Years: Journals 1853-1855, ed. and trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (London: The Fontana Library, 
1965), p. 99. 
38. Soren KIERKEGAARD, Fear and Trembling and the Sickness unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (Garden City: 
Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1954), p. 173. 
39. RH, p. 273. 
40. Ibid., p. 273. 
41. John D. CAPUTO, "Radical Hermeneutics and Religious Truth: The Case of Sheehan and Schillebeeckx," 
in Phenomenology of the Truth Proper to Religion, ed. Daniel Guerrière (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1990), p. 166. 
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of the other presents to us, disclosing thereby any number of interpretations (the fact 
moreover that no sooner do we reach the other than the other's otherness withdraws 
from us) is a constant reminder that we are always engaged in possibility. Possibility 
presents itself to us in our dealings with the other. But precisely because our arm is 
not long enough to reach the true alterity of the other, i.e., we cannot grasp the other's 
infinity, in just this way we cannot see the face of God. It is only in the face of our 
fellow human beings, co-sufferers in the flux, that we can have a glimpse of the face 
of God. We are reminded that even Moses only caught the back of God. 
The religious insight that animates radical hermeneutics — its attempt to cope 
with the suffering induced by the flux and its rejection of metaphysics — brings it 
into a deep and genuine association with Kierkegaard's thought. Its appropriation of 
repetition as the task of human existence is spelled out both in its phenomenological 
method and its hermeneutic practice. For it captures the most vital features of repetition: 
the futurity of its thrust, the groundlessness of its freedom, and the transcendence of 
its reason for being. 
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